From a7fdf479a524a3252e3d875a9ee667af6b57517d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: danger Date: Sat, 2 Nov 2024 12:27:43 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] henry-1.67commit --- input/edit.i64 | Bin 249881 -> 249881 bytes input/recv.i64 | Bin 208473 -> 208473 bytes output/recv_patch/recv | Bin 51608 -> 51608 bytes src/Extract_code | 2 +- src/chat_log.json | 26 ---------------------- src/output/edit_extract/patch_strcpy.json | 18 +++++++++++++++ src/output/recv_extract/patch_recv.json | 18 +++++++++++++++ 7 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-) diff --git a/input/edit.i64 b/input/edit.i64 index c2e83538885017ad398041fa1c5073144537d9a0..91ff49f92a9c36020382425fade931b8926c24ac 100644 GIT binary patch delta 60 zcmV-C0K@;8pbwd#50E$nE@=o~kvuRE8MrHo|NWzedpyBV>yfallQ98;f&PX50k!@D S?O6g1q=)TV0=Mm211xnLeH$DA delta 60 zcmV-C0K@;8pbwd#50E$nkgXh+kvuRExv`>j$Q{dKP@DR{t>u`glQ98;f&PX50k!@D S?O6ik6Nl|u0=Mm211xoE_#F`d diff --git a/input/recv.i64 b/input/recv.i64 index 7310622690781728d3ca1948787d924715d84671..7655d4466eefea6bd6b29833817a8eba77a2fd70 100644 GIT binary patch delta 69 zcmcb4hv()Uo(UE#-MwMYC)yYY%rUbxVEFjmDPre(v6JV`Zca92Y})v*zMAjaV%2m8 ZAYf$p%fZ0V++EY&UBkG&yN2o9MgS-@9P|JH delta 69 zcmcb4hv()Uo(UE#f-0-sC)yYYe2o5Gr}wvfspa$t=fKtGR+9}Gn>PNdujbPcQB7w6 Z0!D_v91M)j-8JpqHH_Q4YnaY$1OU_;8jt`0 diff --git a/output/recv_patch/recv b/output/recv_patch/recv index e0b71a610ad650dbbbc383eda304b4e68ae9e9d5..88be3eafcc697bca1b45705fdea73446c0f35a17 100755 GIT binary patch delta 17 ZcmbO+nR&)!<_*jVO#c}+vnEW=1OPkA2893s delta 17 ZcmbO+nR&)!<_*jVObm>hSraB_0su7E1&06t diff --git a/src/Extract_code b/src/Extract_code index 9bd4f14..78abb34 160000 --- a/src/Extract_code +++ b/src/Extract_code @@ -1 +1 @@ -Subproject commit 9bd4f149a51a3953a9ec15d108e655be11ede790 +Subproject commit 78abb34f2bb4325eb0da265ebdac8d54ade50a4f diff --git a/src/chat_log.json b/src/chat_log.json index 1eebcfd..320d18f 100644 --- a/src/chat_log.json +++ b/src/chat_log.json @@ -1404,31 +1404,5 @@ "role": "assistant", "content": "Yes, reason here: The `recv` function in the `echo_handler` function is vulnerable to a buffer overflow. The `recv` function is called with a buffer size of `0x400` (1024 bytes), but the `buffer` array is only 256 bytes in size. This means that if more than 256 bytes are received, it will overflow the `buffer` array, potentially overwriting adjacent memory and leading to undefined behavior or security vulnerabilities." } - ], - [ - { - "role": "user", - "content": "Please analyze whether the following program contains a dprintf format string vulnerability. If you find dprintf format string vulnerability please answer with 'yes, reason here'.\n//Function: echo_handler ->0x4199190 7 perm->5\nint __cdecl echo_handler(int sock)\n{\n char buffer[256]; // [rsp+10h] [rbp-100h] BYREF\n\n memset(buffer, 0, sizeof(buffer));\n return recv(sock, buffer, 0x100uLL, 0) > 0 && dprintf(sock, buffer) > 0;\n}\n\n\n//Function: main ->0x4199603 7 perm->5\nint __fastcall main(int argc, const char **argv, const char **envp)\n{\n uint16_t v3; // ax\n char client_addr_str[24]; // [rsp+0h] [rbp-40h] BYREF\n int addrlen; // [rsp+18h] [rbp-28h] BYREF\n int opt; // [rsp+1Ch] [rbp-24h] BYREF\n sockaddr_in address; // [rsp+20h] [rbp-20h] BYREF\n int new_socket; // [rsp+38h] [rbp-8h]\n int server_fd; // [rsp+3Ch] [rbp-4h]\n\n opt = 1;\n addrlen = 16;\n server_fd = socket(2, 1, 0);\n if ( !server_fd )\n {\n perror(\"socket failed\");\n exit(1);\n }\n if ( setsockopt(server_fd, 1, 15, &opt, 4u) )\n {\n perror(\"setsockopt\");\n exit(1);\n }\n address.sin_family = 2;\n address.sin_addr.s_addr = 0;\n address.sin_port = htons(0x2B00u);\n if ( bind(server_fd, (const struct sockaddr *)&address, 0x10u) < 0 )\n {\n perror(\"bind failed\");\n exit(1);\n }\n if ( listen(server_fd, 3) < 0 )\n {\n perror(\"listen\");\n exit(1);\n }\n printf(\"TCP server listening on port %d\\n\", 11008);\n new_socket = accept(server_fd, (struct sockaddr *)&address, (socklen_t *)&addrlen);\n if ( new_socket < 0 )\n {\n perror(\"accept\");\n exit(1);\n }\n inet_ntop(2, &address.sin_addr, client_addr_str, 0x10u);\n v3 = ntohs(address.sin_port);\n printf(\"Accept %s:%d\\n\", client_addr_str, v3);\n while ( echo_handler(new_socket) )\n ;\n close(new_socket);\n return 0;\n}\n\n\n//Function: backdoor ->0x4200059 7 perm->5\nint __cdecl backdoor()\n{\n char *new_envp[2]; // [rsp+0h] [rbp-20h] BYREF\n char *new_argv[2]; // [rsp+10h] [rbp-10h] BYREF\n\n new_argv[1] = 0LL;\n new_envp[0] = \"PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin\";\n new_envp[1] = 0LL;\n dup2(4, 0);\n dup2(4, 1);\n dup2(4, 2);\n execve(\"/bin/sh\", new_argv, new_envp);\n return 0;\n}\n\n\n" - }, - { - "role": "assistant", - "content": "Yes, the program contains a format string vulnerability in the `echo_handler` function. The vulnerability arises from the use of `dprintf(sock, buffer)` where `buffer` is directly passed as the format string. Since `buffer` is populated with data received from the network via the `recv` function, an attacker can send a specially crafted string to exploit this vulnerability.\n\nIf the attacker sends format specifiers (like `%s`, `%x`, `%n`, etc.) in the data received into `buffer`, these will be interpreted by `dprintf` as format specifiers, potentially leading to information disclosure, denial of service, or even arbitrary code execution, depending on the context and the specific format specifiers used.\n\nTo mitigate this vulnerability, the code should use a fixed format string and pass `buffer` as an argument, like so:\n\n```c\ndprintf(sock, \"%s\", buffer);\n```\n\nThis change ensures that any format specifiers in `buffer` are treated as literal text rather than being interpreted by `dprintf`." - }, - { - "role": "user", - "content": "Please analyze whether the following program contains a dprintf format string vulnerability. If you find dprintf format string vulnerability please answer with 'yes, reason here'.\n//Function: echo_handler ->0x4199190 7 perm->5\nint __cdecl echo_handler(int sock)\n{\n char buffer[256]; // [rsp+10h] [rbp-100h] BYREF\n\n memset(buffer, 0, sizeof(buffer));\n return recv(sock, buffer, 0x100uLL, 0) > 0 && dprintf(sock, buffer) > 0;\n}\n\n\n//Function: main ->0x4199603 7 perm->5\nint __fastcall main(int argc, const char **argv, const char **envp)\n{\n uint16_t v3; // ax\n char client_addr_str[24]; // [rsp+0h] [rbp-40h] BYREF\n int addrlen; // [rsp+18h] [rbp-28h] BYREF\n int opt; // [rsp+1Ch] [rbp-24h] BYREF\n sockaddr_in address; // [rsp+20h] [rbp-20h] BYREF\n int new_socket; // [rsp+38h] [rbp-8h]\n int server_fd; // [rsp+3Ch] [rbp-4h]\n\n opt = 1;\n addrlen = 16;\n server_fd = socket(2, 1, 0);\n if ( !server_fd )\n {\n perror(\"socket failed\");\n exit(1);\n }\n if ( setsockopt(server_fd, 1, 15, &opt, 4u) )\n {\n perror(\"setsockopt\");\n exit(1);\n }\n address.sin_family = 2;\n address.sin_addr.s_addr = 0;\n address.sin_port = htons(0x2B00u);\n if ( bind(server_fd, (const struct sockaddr *)&address, 0x10u) < 0 )\n {\n perror(\"bind failed\");\n exit(1);\n }\n if ( listen(server_fd, 3) < 0 )\n {\n perror(\"listen\");\n exit(1);\n }\n printf(\"TCP server listening on port %d\\n\", 11008);\n new_socket = accept(server_fd, (struct sockaddr *)&address, (socklen_t *)&addrlen);\n if ( new_socket < 0 )\n {\n perror(\"accept\");\n exit(1);\n }\n inet_ntop(2, &address.sin_addr, client_addr_str, 0x10u);\n v3 = ntohs(address.sin_port);\n printf(\"Accept %s:%d\\n\", client_addr_str, v3);\n while ( echo_handler(new_socket) )\n ;\n close(new_socket);\n return 0;\n}\n\n\n//Function: backdoor ->0x4200059 7 perm->5\nint __cdecl backdoor()\n{\n char *new_envp[2]; // [rsp+0h] [rbp-20h] BYREF\n char *new_argv[2]; // [rsp+10h] [rbp-10h] BYREF\n\n new_argv[1] = 0LL;\n new_envp[0] = \"PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin\";\n new_envp[1] = 0LL;\n dup2(4, 0);\n dup2(4, 1);\n dup2(4, 2);\n execve(\"/bin/sh\", new_argv, new_envp);\n return 0;\n}\n\n\n" - }, - { - "role": "assistant", - "content": "Yes, the program contains a format string vulnerability in the `echo_handler` function. The vulnerability arises from the use of `dprintf(sock, buffer)` without specifying a format string. This allows an attacker to send a format string as input through the socket, which will be interpreted by `dprintf` as a format specifier. This can lead to various security issues, such as reading from or writing to arbitrary memory locations, depending on the format string used by the attacker. To mitigate this vulnerability, you should use a format specifier in `dprintf`, such as `dprintf(sock, \"%s\", buffer)`, to ensure that the input is treated as a string and not as a format specifier." - }, - { - "role": "user", - "content": "Please analyze whether the following program contains a dprintf format string vulnerability. If you find dprintf format string vulnerability please answer with 'yes, reason here'.\n//Function: echo_handler ->0x4199190 7 perm->5\nint __cdecl echo_handler(int sock)\n{\n char buffer[256]; // [rsp+10h] [rbp-100h] BYREF\n\n memset(buffer, 0, sizeof(buffer));\n return recv(sock, buffer, 0x100uLL, 0) > 0 && dprintf(sock, buffer) > 0;\n}\n\n\n//Function: main ->0x4199603 7 perm->5\nint __fastcall main(int argc, const char **argv, const char **envp)\n{\n uint16_t v3; // ax\n char client_addr_str[24]; // [rsp+0h] [rbp-40h] BYREF\n int addrlen; // [rsp+18h] [rbp-28h] BYREF\n int opt; // [rsp+1Ch] [rbp-24h] BYREF\n sockaddr_in address; // [rsp+20h] [rbp-20h] BYREF\n int new_socket; // [rsp+38h] [rbp-8h]\n int server_fd; // [rsp+3Ch] [rbp-4h]\n\n opt = 1;\n addrlen = 16;\n server_fd = socket(2, 1, 0);\n if ( !server_fd )\n {\n perror(\"socket failed\");\n exit(1);\n }\n if ( setsockopt(server_fd, 1, 15, &opt, 4u) )\n {\n perror(\"setsockopt\");\n exit(1);\n }\n address.sin_family = 2;\n address.sin_addr.s_addr = 0;\n address.sin_port = htons(0x2B00u);\n if ( bind(server_fd, (const struct sockaddr *)&address, 0x10u) < 0 )\n {\n perror(\"bind failed\");\n exit(1);\n }\n if ( listen(server_fd, 3) < 0 )\n {\n perror(\"listen\");\n exit(1);\n }\n printf(\"TCP server listening on port %d\\n\", 11008);\n new_socket = accept(server_fd, (struct sockaddr *)&address, (socklen_t *)&addrlen);\n if ( new_socket < 0 )\n {\n perror(\"accept\");\n exit(1);\n }\n inet_ntop(2, &address.sin_addr, client_addr_str, 0x10u);\n v3 = ntohs(address.sin_port);\n printf(\"Accept %s:%d\\n\", client_addr_str, v3);\n while ( echo_handler(new_socket) )\n ;\n close(new_socket);\n return 0;\n}\n\n\n//Function: backdoor ->0x4200059 7 perm->5\nint __cdecl backdoor()\n{\n char *new_envp[2]; // [rsp+0h] [rbp-20h] BYREF\n char *new_argv[2]; // [rsp+10h] [rbp-10h] BYREF\n\n new_argv[1] = 0LL;\n new_envp[0] = \"PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin\";\n new_envp[1] = 0LL;\n dup2(4, 0);\n dup2(4, 1);\n dup2(4, 2);\n execve(\"/bin/sh\", new_argv, new_envp);\n return 0;\n}\n\n\n" - }, - { - "role": "assistant", - "content": "Yes, the program contains a `dprintf` format string vulnerability. The vulnerability is present in the `echo_handler` function, where the `dprintf` function is called with `buffer` as its format string argument:\n\n```c\ndprintf(sock, buffer)\n```\n\nThe `buffer` is filled with data received from the network via the `recv` function:\n\n```c\nrecv(sock, buffer, 0x100uLL, 0)\n```\n\nSince the contents of `buffer` are controlled by the network client, an attacker can send a specially crafted string containing format specifiers (e.g., `%x`, `%s`, `%n`) to exploit this vulnerability. This can lead to information disclosure, denial of service, or even arbitrary code execution, depending on the specifics of the attack and the environment in which the program is running." - } ] ] \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/src/output/edit_extract/patch_strcpy.json b/src/output/edit_extract/patch_strcpy.json index f912773..f023b10 100644 --- a/src/output/edit_extract/patch_strcpy.json +++ b/src/output/edit_extract/patch_strcpy.json @@ -1148,5 +1148,23 @@ "vul_info": [], "fix_size": 1035, "patch_info": "we need to consider the size of the destination buffer, which is `newNode->data`. However, the size of `newNode->data` is not explicitly provided in the code snippet you shared. " + }, + { + "file_name": "edit_extract.c", + "vul_info": [], + "fix_size": 1024, + "patch_info": "we need to consider the size of the destination buffer where the string is being copied. In the `add` function, the destination buffer is `newNode->data`." + }, + { + "file_name": "edit_extract.c", + "vul_info": [], + "fix_size": 1035, + "patch_info": "we need to consider the size of the destination buffer, which is `newNode->data`. However, the code snippet provided does not explicitly define the structure of `Node` or the size of `newNode->data`. " + }, + { + "file_name": "edit_extract.c", + "vul_info": [], + "fix_size": 1024, + "patch_info": "we need to consider the size of the destination buffer where the string is being copied. In the `add` function, the destination buffer is `newNode->data`." } ] \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/src/output/recv_extract/patch_recv.json b/src/output/recv_extract/patch_recv.json index 250a035..6f61531 100644 --- a/src/output/recv_extract/patch_recv.json +++ b/src/output/recv_extract/patch_recv.json @@ -200,5 +200,23 @@ "vul_info": [], "fix_size": 256, "patch_info": "but `recv` is called with a size of 0x400 (1024) bytes, which can lead to a buffer overflow if more than 256 bytes are received." + }, + { + "file_name": "recv_extract.c", + "vul_info": [], + "fix_size": 255, + "patch_info": "you should limit the size of data received to match the buffer size. The buffer `buffer` is declared with a size of 256 bytes. Therefore, the `recv` call should be limited to 255 bytes to leave space for the null terminator." + }, + { + "file_name": "recv_extract.c", + "vul_info": [], + "fix_size": 256, + "patch_info": "you should limit the size of data received to the size of the buffer. In the `echo_handler` function, the buffer is defined as `char buffer[256];`, which means it can safely hold up to 256 bytes." + }, + { + "file_name": "recv_extract.c", + "vul_info": [], + "fix_size": 255, + "patch_info": "you should limit the size of the data received by the `recv` function to the size of the buffer. The buffer is declared as `char buffer[256];`, so the maximum safe size for `recv` should be 255 bytes to leave room for the null terminator." } ] \ No newline at end of file